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Shaun Breslin, University of Warwick, UK 
 
ABSTRACT 
When discussing the “success” of China’s transition from socialism, there is a 
tendency to focus on growth figures as an indication of performance. Whilst these 
figures are indeed impressive, we should not confuse growth with development and 
assume that the former necessarily automatically generates the latter. Much has been 
done to reduce poverty in China, but the task is not as complete as some observers 
would suggest; particularly in terms of access to health, education and welfare, and 
also in dealing with relative (rather than absolute) depravation and poverty. Visions of 
China have been constructed that exaggerate Chinese development and power in the 
global system partly to serve political interests, but partly due to the failure to 
consider the relationship between growth and development, partly due to the failure to 
disaggregate “who gets what” in China, and  partly due to the persistence of inter-
national conceptions of globalised production, trade, and financial flows. 
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It would be strange if China’s economic performance had not generated massive 
international attention. Of course China is not the first country to emerge from relative 
backwardness with sustained high growth rates, but in many ways it is the sheer scale 
of the Chinese case that marks it out for special attention; the sheer size of the 
economy, the number and value of exports and the resulting trade surplus, the foreign 
currency holdings, the massive flows of inward investment and more recently, the 
growth of outward investment all combine to ensure that virtually no country has been 
unaffected by what has happened in China.  
   But while the focus on China is entirely understandable, some of the 
conclusions of studies of Chinese growth are not always as easy to comprehend. In 
particular, while the overall size and scale of economic activity in China are clearly 
important, focussing on growth and the aggregate national situation –‘GDPism’1 – 
tends to confuse growth with development and can result in the domestic distribution 
of the fruits of growth being ignored. It also can be used to exaggerate the extent of 
Chinese power in the global political economy – both present and projected.  
 As such, the critique of GDPism contains two main elements. The first points 
to the uneven developmental consequences of growth in China and the extent of 
residual poverty – issues that are well understood by not only students of Chinese 
politics but also the Chinese leadership, and thus will be covered with relative brevity. 
The second asks why it is that visions and understandings have been constructed that 
tend to exaggerate China’s wealth and power, and to outline the consequences of these 
constructed images for policy making? 
 The answer is partly found in the domestic policy making environments of 
countries responding to Chinese economic growth. Manoeuvring to compete for the 
benefits that China’s future economic wealth will generate (often fired by the 
lobbying and initiatives of business interests)2  results in constructed understandings 
of what China will become in the future dictating policy towards China today. Or put 
another way, expectations of future power condition current policy to the extent that 
China has been cognitively externally empowered. But the answer is also partly found 
in the dominance of theoretical approaches that focus on the nation state as the unit of 
analysis.  
Whilst China is clearly important and likely to become ever more so, a 
different ‘knowledge’ of China’s power and position in the global order is generated 
                                                 
1  I use the term GDPism as this paper was first presented at the Third East Asian Social Policy 
Research Network International Conference on ‘GDPism and Risk: Challenges for Social 
Development and Governance in East Asia’ at the University of Bristol’s Centre for East 
Asian Studies in July 2006. 
2  I discussed how UK policy towards China was influenced by notions of international 
competition to access the Chinese market in Breslin (2004). 
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by deploying different theoretical approaches; approaches that (re)connect the 
domestic with the international, that acknowledge the fragmentation of production 
(and trade) in a post-fordist globalised economy; and move away from an 
understanding of states as the sole repositories of power in the global political 
economy.  
 
Different Visions of China 
Popular visions and understandings of China vary significantly, so any attempt to 
provide an overview can only deal in challengeable overgeneralizations. With this 
caveat in mind, we can observe that there are four major strands to popular visions 
and understandings of China today – the first two of which are the most important in 
shaping popular understandings, and in some places, policy towards China. The first 
focuses on China as a repressive and coercive authoritarian political system; perhaps 
no longer a ‘Stalinist dictatorship’, but certainly ‘not free’. The campaigning work of 
Human Rights and religious groups and those promoting Tibetan independence, 
relatively frequent investigative media reports, and the annual US report on ‘Human 
Rights Practices’3 all ensure that the issue remains on the international agenda – albeit 
with a rather lower profile today than in the days after 4th June 1989. This focus on 
human rights frequently clearly irks many in China – and not just party-state officials 
– but whilst it may be unpalatable, it is important to accept that this is indeed a strong 
basis of many external visions and understandings of China. As will be discussed in 
more detail below, perceptions of China’s rise are very much coloured by concerns 
about the type of political system that is rising. 
                                                 
3  These reports can be found on http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt. Since 1998, the Chinese 
authorities have responded by issuing their own annual report on ‘The Human Rights Record 
of the United States’ – see http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-
03/08/content_5817027.htm 
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 Until fairly recently, the rights and freedom discourse was perhaps the 
dominant source of perceptions of China. The vote in the US congress over whether 
to renew China’s Most Favoured Nation status provided an annual opportunity for 
high profile discussion, as did the annual resolutions condemning China’s human 
rights record at the UN Human Rights Commission. But while such a resolution came 
within one vote of being adopted in 1995, the EU stopped tabling resolutions in 1997 
followed by the US in 2002. In addition, the need for an annual debate and vote in 
Washington came to an end in 1999 when China was awarded Permanent Normal 
Trade Relations as part of the process of ensuring WTO entry.  
Such an apparent downgrading of the significance of human rights is, for some, 
a result of the increasing significance of the second major image of China – a vision 
of a rich and economically (at least) powerful China that provides new challenges to 
the existing balance of power in the global order. Whilst what China might become at 
some point in the future is the focus for some, there is already a school of thought that 
conceives of China as already having great power in the global political economy, and 
a larger school that suggests that the assumption of power is inevitable.4  It might be 
tempting to dismiss these works as sensationalist, but this view of China has 
resonance amongst a public who see media stories of the world’s biggest ship 
bringing 11,000 containers of Christmas supplies from China to Europe ‘to the relief 
of children, parents and shopkeepers everywhere - but to the despair of European 
manufacturers’ (Vidal 2006). And at times, the fear that this new ‘manufacturing 
superpower’ is leading to job losses in the West comes to the fore of political 
                                                 
4  For the argument that as a result, military conflict with the USA is inevitable see Bernstein 
and Munro (1998), Timperlake (1999), Gertz (2002) and Menges (2005). Mosher (2000) 
argues that China’s centuries old superiority complex is driving s strategy to return itself to its 
rightful place of global dominance, while Thomas (2001), and Babbin and Timperlake (2006) 
suggest that China is willing to ally with radical Islam to find a means of overcoming the US. 
For the view that economic superpower status is here or inevitable, see Weidenbaum and 
Hughes (1996), Bacani (2003), Overholt (1994) and Murray (1998). 
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campaigning as well – particularly during election campaigns in the US. Not only is 
this understanding firing popular perceptions of China, it is also has considerable 
purchase in some policy making circles, influencing the adoption of policy towards 
China.5  
 As noted above, these two visions tend to be dominant, but there are other 
visions and interpretations. A third broad approach points to a bleak future. For some, 
China has reached the limits of economic liberalisation within an authoritarian 
political framework (Pei 2006) and is in a state of crisis (Pei 2002) searching for a 
miracle (Naím 2003) to avoid the collapse of party rule and perhaps even the Chinese 
state (Chang 2002).  And then there are those who form a fourth broadly defined 
group who acknowledge that massive changes have taken place in China and that 
China’s global significance has increased, but also point to the developmental 
problems that remain to be resolved (and in some areas are getting worse), the real 
social tensions that in some cases have been exacerbated by reform, and the domestic 
governance challenges for the CCP.6  This latter set of writings tends to be academic 
rather than policy oriented or ‘popular’ – and increasingly chimes with the research 
agenda of Chinese researchers, the political-economic stance of the group of Chinese 
intellectuals who fall under the broad heading of the ‘New Left’ and the 
developmental agenda of the fourth generation of Chinese leaders under Hu Jintao 
and Wen Jiabao. Whilst these understandings have been reflected in the media,7  they 
do not seem to have a significant impact on popular visions of China. Perhaps shades 
of grey are simply less interesting and less immediate than stark black and white 
statements and interpretations.  
                                                 
5  If not in the professional China watching foreign policy communities. 
6  Examples in chronological order include Bernstein and Lu (2003), Solinger (2005), Croll 
(2006), Shirk (2007) and Breslin (2007).  
7  For example, in the UK, James Kynge of the Financial Times and Jonathan Watt of the 
Guardian regularly file stories focusing on those negative impacts of liberalisation.  
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 This paper has started from the assertion that Chinese power in the global 
system is exaggerated and not surprisingly, would fit squarely in the last of these four 
(overly)broad characterizations. But while the intention is indeed in part to provide an 
antidote to some of the more hyperbolic interpretations of Chinese power, its main 
intention is to consider why these different interpretations emerge (rather than simply 
whether they are ‘right’ or ‘wrong’). In trying to explain these varying approaches, we 
need to concentrate on different sources of information, different audiences and 
different theoretical approaches.  
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Explaining Conflicting Visions 
Evidential Contexts  
Although it might sound counterintuitive, the increasing number of foreigners that 
visit China can actually generate misunderstanding. Visitors typically do not stray far 
from the newly built modern urban centres, and tend to come into contact with the 
very real experiences of increasing prosperity but not the equally real experiences of 
the less well off and the still poor. This is exacerbated by the ‘Shanghai phenomenon’. 
Shanghai has in become the symbol of ‘new China’ as images of the Pearl TV Tower 
and the rest of Pudong have become common across the world as representative of not 
just the vibrant, growing and increasingly rich parts of the Chinese economy, but of 
China per se.  
For those lucky enough to spend much of our time either in China or reading 
about China, there is a rich pool of evidence to draw on in building understandings. 
Clearly this is not the case for many visitors to China, and even less so for the general 
public whose contact with China is overwhelmingly from a distance or ‘second hand’. 
Here what is provided by the media is of course very important, as too is the direct 
exposure that they have to China or things Chinese. In much of the West, this was 
until recently pretty largely confined to food. Over the last decade (and particularly 
over the past five years) the rapid growth of Chinese exports has increased exposure 
to the idea of China as a global economic force. Quite simply, when people think 
about ‘China’, two key words often come first – ‘Made In’. 
This economic focus has been reinforced by the growth of Chinese outward 
investment. Though still relatively small by global standards, the purchase of Rover 
by SAIC in the UK, and the ultimately unsuccessful attempt to buy the US based 
Unocal oil firm have contributed to the idea that China is becoming a major global 
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force. This understanding is reinforced by Chinese ‘resource diplomacy’ in Latin 
America and in particular in Africa – whether directly or indirectly, it appears as if 
‘the Chinese are coming’.  
   
Per capita or Gross? Size really does matter 
There is also the question of how evidence is calculated. Clearly if you take a gross 
national position, then understandings of China might be rather different than 
deploying per capita perspectives. Not very much multiplied by 1.3 billion equals an 
enormous amount. We will return to the importance of per capita perspectives later, 
but here it is worth acknowledging that the evidence supplied by gross figures really 
is important. China might be a very low per capita producer of CO2 for example, but 
sheer numbers mean that the amount of CO2 China produces has massive significance 
and has an important impact on the global commons.  
 So using this gross form of evidence is clearly valid in some contexts. The key 
is to ensure that the most appropriate figures are used in each context. Returning to 
the environmental example, China is rightly identified as being a major source of CO2  
emissions, but if the per capita dimension is not considered, then it might not be 
possible to think of effective solutions to the problem. For example, if existing 
conceptions of solutions are just based on dealing with the environmental 
consequences of wealth which might be expected with this level of emissions (and 
indeed, does form part of the problem in China), then those environmental issues that 
are consequences of underdevelopment and indeed even poverty may not be 
considered. So in alerting policy makers to why China is significant, then the gross 
size is important – its what’s done after the alerting has been achieved that can be 
problematic if more nuanced approaches built on the reality of contemporary China 
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are ignored.  
Despite many epistemological differences, not least over the structural basis of 
international relations, a key strand that links critical post-Marxist and postmodern 
thinkers is the understanding that theory and knowledge are never politically neutral. 
The analysis in this paper is more informed by the former than the latter, and in 
particular the oft cited words of Robert Cox (1981: 128) that ‘theory is always for 
someone and for some purpose’. So the questions that need to be addressed here are 
for whom and for firstly what purpose are these images of China constructed? 
 
For What Purpose 
China as the Orange Peril? 
One of the reasons that China generates so much interest is that many people are 
really worried about what the rise of China will mean for them. Furthermore, it is not 
just that China is changing, but that it is changing so quickly. It is not that long ago 
that China was, in Napoleon’s terms, sleeping and irrelevant for most people in the 
West. That it has become relatively important so quickly perhaps explains why fear of 
China is sometimes so exaggerated.  
But there is more to it that this. People really are worried about what China 
represents now, and what China will or might mean for the global order. Here we 
partly return to the issue of human rights and perceptions of a China that does not 
adhere to ‘our’ way of thinking or ‘our’ way of doing things. And China also 
represents in one entity two of the big fears of the last century – the challenge to the 
west from a resurgent and confident Asia, and the challenge to the west of 
communism. In this respect, the twentieth century challenge to the west is embodied 
in the construction of a sinophobia against a China that is both the yellow (Asian) and 
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red (communist) perils combined, and therefore becomes a new ‘orange peril’ for the 
twenty-first century.  
 
Promoting Visions of China in China 
This fear of China is, in some parts at least, a consequence of the way in which the 
Chinese authorities themselves have constructed a vision of China within China that is 
then (partially) seen overseas. From the very onset of the reform process in 1978, the 
Chinese leadership itself has placed a heavy emphasis on growth as an indicator of 
success, and as a means of gaining legitimacy. In the past at least, Chinese authorities 
have not shied away from triumphing their success in generating growth and doubling, 
trebling and quadrupling GDP. Indeed, the target of raising GDP by a factor of X was 
an often and loudly proclaimed objective of economic reform in the first place. At the 
international level, the ‘Peaceful Rise of China’ was developed by Zheng Bijian to 
assuage concern over China’s emerging role by pointing to the positive benefits that 
China will bring for other economies.8  In this respect, GDPism has become a small 
element of Chinese foreign policy in that arenas such as the Bo’ao Forum for Asia are 
used to reinforce the message that Chinese growth is a source of regional stability, and 
therefore it is in other countries’ interests to engage the emerging economic power.  
The Peaceful Rise discourse highlights a slight schizophrenia in the way that 
the Chinese authorities project China internationally. On one hand, it not only serves a 
strategic purpose, but also reflects a growing self confidence about China’s global role. 
But on the other hand, the Chinese leadership recognises that there has been much 
more attention on the ‘rise’ (jueqi 崛起) than the ‘peaceful’ (heping和平) half of the 
                                                 
8  For an English language explanation of the Peaceful Rise hypothesis, see Zheng (2005). 
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slogan.9  As a result, it has reinforced the very ‘China threat’ hypothesis in the US 
and elsewhere that the ‘peaceful rise’ was designed to contradict in the first place.   
It is true that this message has been tempered when it comes to the 
international level. The Chinese leadership is quick to point out to the rest of the 
world that China is still a relatively poor and developing country that should not be 
expected to shoulder the burdens and obligations of the rich. Witness, for example, the 
(misguided) attempts to ensure that China was classified as a developing economy 
during the WTO entry negotiations.10  It is also true, that the domestic discourse has 
changed with the transfer of power to the fourth generation of leadership in the guise 
of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao. The emphasis on harmonious development (hexie 
fazhan和谐发展) is based on a recognition that much still remains to be done in terms 
of promoting development (as opposed to just generating growth) and that the reform 
experience has not been wholly successful for all. Which brings us to the key issue of 
the relationship between growth and development, and interpretations of the two. 
 
GDPism 
When viewed with a little more historical distance, the 16th Party Congress may well 
come to be seen as a key turning point in the evolution of economic reform in China. 
It is not so much the focus on dealing with the negative consequences of reform that 
have become associated with the Hu-Wen leadership, though this is clearly important. 
It’s more that for the first time (or more correctly, for the first time for a while), there 
was a formal recognition that growth and development were not the same thing, and 
                                                 
9  Though Jiang Zemin is widely thought to have rejected the idea of Peaceful Rise when it was 
first suggested as it was not a powerful enough signal of China’s real potential, and 
underplayed the potential lack of peace in future relations with Taiwan and possibly the 
United States. 
10  Misguided because there are no definitions of ‘developing’ at the WTO with the actual terms 
of any new member determined by hard nosed bargaining with existing members rather than 
by pre-existing templates of duties and obligations. See Breslin (2003). 
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that it was time to move the focus of attention from the former to the latter.  
 There is much that could be said about this domestic change, but in terms of 
discussing how visions of China are constructed, the emphasis here is on the extent to 
which external observations of China have tended to either focus on growth rather 
than development or often to simply use the two terms interchangeably. As growth is 
primarily a quantitative issue and development more qualitative, this creates a number 
of misunderstandings (although there are was of ‘measuring’ development of sorts – 
for example, Human Development Indexes). First, when you start from a very low 
base, very high growth rates can be generated in relatively poor countries; produce 
one tractor one year and two the next, and you have 100 per cent growth, but you still 
only have three tractors. And then, of course, there is the additional questions of 
which statistics to be used, Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) or atlas method exchange 
rates, and the already mentioned divergence between per capita and gross figures. 
Proponents of Chinese wealth and power point to close to double digit growth 
maintained for over two decades, yet China still remains a relatively poor country in 
per capita terms coming in at 107th using PPP (US$6,600 per capita) and 128th 
(US$1,740 per capita) using the atlas method in lists of the world’s richest countries 
in per capita terms.  
China as a whole may no longer be considered to be ‘poor’, but is still on 
ranked as a ‘middle income’ country at best, and more often as ‘lower middle income’. 
If we take the higher of the per capita income figures using PPP calculations, then 
China still comes out below Kazakhstan, Namibia, Tonga, Iran, Equatorial Guinea, 
Thailand, Costa Rica and many others. Yet this is something that is overlooked or 
perhaps deliberately ignored in the construction of some visions of China as already 
rich and powerful. And notwithstanding the fact that millions have been brought out 
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of poverty in China, Jeffrey Sachs’s assertion that ‘we can see from China's 
experience that the end of poverty is absolutely palpable and real in the space of a 
very few years’ (Watts 2006) rather overestimates the situation, and skips over the 
millions or rural Chinese that are still in poverty, the many millions more that are 
danger of slipping back into poverty, and the increasing numbers of urban poor 
(Breslin, 2007: 164-7). 
Furthermore, whilst growth is clearly important in providing the wherewithal 
for development programmes, growth does not necessarily lead to development. The 
actions of governments in particular, but also other social forces are crucial in 
ensuring that growth is utilised to create development. And has been argued by Wang 
Shaoguang and Hu Angang (1993, 2001) China’s ability to ‘capture’ the benefits of 
growth and use it for developmental projects – China’s ‘state capacity’ - has been very 
poor.11  There also seems to be a common assumption that China will follow the same 
path of progression up the value chain and follow the same developmental trajectory 
of places like South Korea. Of course this might be the case – there is much to 
suggest that it probably will. But to assume that it is inevitable is simply apolitical 
and ignores the key role of governments in establishing developmental policies and 
transferring growth to development. Let’s put teleological explanations aside and 
think of the typical definition of politics as ‘the art and science of government’. As 
Zha (2005) notes, whilst emulating the earlier developmental states of East Asia is 
highly possible and perhaps probably, emulating the developmental failures of Latin 
America in the 1970s is not impossible.  
In addition, the investment-trade nexus has created growth and boosted 
China’s international profile without generating as much development as the growth 
                                                 
11  Notwithstanding the fiscal reforms of 1994 which at least allowed the central government to 
get hold of some of those fiscal revenues that had previously remained at the provincial level. 
See Bahl (1999) and Tsai (2004).  
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figures might suggest to the casual observer – an issue we will return to later in this 
paper. 
 
GDPism and the Neoliberal Project 
It is not surprising that there is such a strong focus on China’s growth figures – they 
really are impressive and as noted above, most people do not have the time and 
resources to delve beneath the headline figures to think in ore nuanced ways. Related 
to this, and somewhat tentatively, the focus on GDPism and growth might possibly be 
related to the desire to promote the neoliberal project. The idea that China has 
witnessed massive and rapid economic growth by abandoning socialist and embracing 
market capitalism might represent a misunderstanding of the relationship between 
state and market in contemporary China. Nevertheless, the understanding that Chinese 
growth is because ‘the masters of China turned towards capitalist enterprise’ (Baumol 
2002: 3) and participation in the global capitalist economy has become widespread, 
and the ‘success’ of capitalism posited in stark contrast to the ‘failure’ of socialism. 
Furthermore, this is a message that appears to being heard and acted on in at least 
some parts of the leadership of other reforming socialist states.  
 
Location, Perspective and Interest 
Where you are writing from (connected to who you are writing for) also appears to be 
an important determinant of interpretations of China. This is partly because different 
analytical approaches dominate academic and policy debates in some parts of the 
world. For example, realist perspectives that are built on assumptions that generate 
specific understandings are much more dominant in East Asian academia than they 
are in parts of Europe (we will return to the issue of different theories and approaches 
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shortly). It is also because the implications of a changing China are differentially felt 
across the globe. For example, within East Asia, the growth of the Chinese economy 
has already had a profound impact on both the structure of the regional political 
economy, and on the developmental trajectories of individual regional states. The 
significance of China is clear and present (though whether significance equates to 
power is a different matter).  
So the significance of China is perhaps understandably more real and obvious 
in East Asia than it is elsewhere. Interestingly, the conception of China as a threat is 
also much more evident in the US than it is in Europe for example, and the majority 
of the literature predicting a future Chinese superpower challenging US power 
emerges from writers based in the US, largely intended to influence US policy makers. 
In discussing this diversity with colleagues based in North America, it has been 
suggested that this reflects a lack of understanding of what China will become in 
Europe. There may have been some truth in this assertion in the past, but China is 
now very much on political and academic agendas across Europe today. Perhaps a key 
difference here is the wide scale acceptance in Europe that there is little we can do to 
change the evolution of china’s futures. As a 2000 report from the British House of 
Parliament on UK relations with China put it, ‘the United Kingdom can only hope to 
influence events in China at the margins’ (Foreign Affairs Committee 2000). But in 
the US, a change in policy towards China could make a difference – hence perhaps 
the intensity of competition to influence policy makers.12   
 This intensity of discussion in the US has, I suggest, resulted in China being 
exaggerated to support different stances on Washington’s China policy. To 
                                                 
12  Though Kagan (2005) suggests that the US is not as powerful as many make out. He argues 
that ‘the idea that we can manage China's rise is comforting because it gives us a sense of 
control and mastery, and of paternalistic superiority’. The lesson of history is this will not be 
possible, and ‘we need to understand that the nature of China's rise will be determined largely 
by the Chinese and not by us’.  
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oversimplify the situation, both those who want to contact and those who want to 
engage China feel the need to talk up China’s importance and significance and power 
to drown out the arguments of the other side – or at the very least, talk in headline 
figures and don’t consider the totality of the developmental experience within China. 
Those who see China as a threat – and not militarily – point to China’s growing GDP, 
trade, and in particular trade surplus with the USA and massive foreign currency 
reserves (more of this later) as evidence of why China should be contained. Those 
who see China as an opportunity point to similar data to prove just how important it is 
to engage China to reap the economic rewards for the US.  
 It is particularly notable that some of the most assertive texts warning of the 
implications of China’s rise for the US are from the same publisher. Gertz’s (2002) 
The China Threat: How the People’s Republic Targets America, Timperlake’s (1999) 
Red Dragon Rising: Communist China's Military Threat to America, and Babbin and 
Timperlake’s (2006) Showdown: Why China Wants War with the United States are all 
published by Regnery. So too was Triplett’s (2004) Rogue State, which argues that 
‘Communist China, far from being a restraining force on North Korea, is actually the 
power behind the regime—how North Korea is, in fact, China’s knife wielded against 
the United States’.13  Regnery also published Year of the Rat (Triplett and Timperlake 
2000) and Betrayal (Gertz 1999), which both accused President Clinton of selling out 
US national interests to China. And Regnery do not hide the fact that their books are 
aimed at what they call ‘conservative readers’ and that they ‘take pride in exposing 
the liberal bias that so often pervades the ‘mainstream’ media’.14  
The annual theatre of the Most Favoured Nation vote may have gone, but 
China remains an important part of political discourses in the US. Although, other 
                                                 
13  This is taken from the publisher’s webpage, www.regnery.com/regnery/040127_rogue.html 
14  This is taken from the publisher’s webpage, www.regnery.com/about.html  
 16
foreign policy issues ultimately became much more important, relations and 
particularly economic relations with China did form part of the Democratic 
campaigns criticisms of George W Bush in late 2003 and 2004. For example, in June 
2004, John Kerry responded to a US-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission Report by criticising the Bush administration for not standing up to 
Chinese violations of international law – particularly in relation to currency 
manipulation: 
America has lost millions of manufacturing jobs. Just yesterday, we learned 
that the trade deficit hit a new record. As the trade deficit with China has 
ballooned, President Bush has stood on the sidelines. He has failed to do 
anything to effectively address China's predatory currency manipulation, its 
violation of intellectual property rights and other unfair trade practices that 
violate its international obligations.15
Whether anything would really have changed in a Kerry administration is something 
that we will never know. George Bush was not the first president to be criticised by 
opponents over China policy. The Clinton administration was similarly castigated by 
Republicans for being soft on China and ignoring US economic interests, not least 
when Bush himself was campaigning for the Presidency. But as outsourcing to China 
continues from the developed West, and China’s economy (and exports from China) 
continue to grow, it is likely that GDPist perspectives will continue to inform the 
policy process – particular, but not only, when an election beckons.  
 Whilst debating what China is (or might become) is perhaps most important in 
the US, it is far from just a Washington phenomenon. In collecting evidence for the 
aforementioned UK parliamentary report, a number of key UK based companies 
                                                 
15  Kerry Statement on the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission's Report 
http://www.johnkerry.com/pressroom/releases/pr_2004_0615b.html 
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constructed a picture of what China might become economically. Without being 
explicit, the message to government seemed to be that China is too big and good an 
opportunity to miss, but this opportunity can only be tapped with significant 
government support. Furthermore, it is a competitive business environment, and if one 
government doesn’t help its companies, then it will lose out to companies in other 
countries who are getting support from their governments. Such help includes formal 
technical aid – for example, export credit guarantees – but also ‘soft’ political support. 
For some critics, this soft support entails accepting Chinese agendas when it comes to 
formal political dialogue, and the relegation of political objectives as secondary to 
economic goals.   
 
Different Theoretical Approaches 
The Failure to Disaggregate the National 
Perspectives of China also differ depending on which theoretical positions are 
deployed. For example, some analytical approaches simply have no interest in the 
differential impact of transformation within China, and instead focus on the aggregate 
picture. For example, some economistic approaches – particularly but not only those 
that are related to the policy domain - tend to work on national level perspectives that 
aggregate the economy into a single unit of analysis. The difference between these 
approaches and those of scholars who consider the domestic dimension in China can 
be summed up by thinking of the questions that their research starts from. For 
example, the former would ask, ‘is the WTO good for China?’ while the latter would 
instead ask ‘who in China will the WTO be good for, and who might it harm?’. 
 Focusing the investigation on the aggregate ignores the disaggregated and 
segregated political reality. To be sure it is easier to consider the nation as a single unit 
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of analysis, but political life is not neat and simply, but messy and complex. We have 
already noted above the definition of politics as ‘the art and science of government’, 
but we should remember Harold Lasswell’s (1936) alternative definition of politics as 
the study of ‘who gets what, when and how’.  
 Whilst the above points to ontological failings (or omissions) of some 
economistic approaches, there are similar failings and or omissions within some 
international relations approaches. It is not surprising that ‘politics’ and ‘international 
relations’ are typically grouped together as a single discipline. The two are usually 
taught alongside each other in individual academic departments or schools – many of 
which happily carry the title of ‘Politics and International Relations’. But in part at 
least, different visions of China emerge from the tendency for the two to be isolated as 
separate and distinct fields of enquiry and the fact that some international relations at 
least has become ‘depoliticised’ 
For many in the realist tradition, there is an assumed ‘national interest’ 
pursued by state actors (and state actors alone) that is unaltered by either the changing 
ideological preferences of state elites or shifting societal interests and alliances. To be 
fair, this is something of a blunt characterisation and generalisation of the broad 
school that we refer to as realism. There are of course realist writers who do consider 
domestic ‘unit level’ factors, and how they condition state actors in framing foreign 
policy. For example, neoclassical realists accept that the domestic level shapes 
interests and preferences, but believe that states’ freedom to act in pursuit of these 
interests is constrained by the nature of the international system – they have some 
agency, but this agency is structurally constrained.16  Such an approach either 
explicitly or by implication characterises the work of those country specialists who 
                                                 
16  Gideon Rose’s (1998) review of Zakaria (1998), Wohlforth (1993), Schweller (1998), 
Christensen (1996) and Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller (1995) provides a good overview of 
how neoclassical realism differs from traditional and neo realism.  
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study the domestic sources of foreign policy whilst retaining an belief in the 
overarching principles of realism, and is perhaps best exemplified in Avery 
Goldstein’s (2005) study of “China’s Grand Strategy”. But for many realists, where 
national interests come from is for others to consider – the job of an IR scholar is to 
study the resulting interplay of politics between states, leaving the study of politics 
within states for others to consider. The diversity and complexity of different opinions, 
aspirations and interests is often ignored or considered irrelevant, and the language of 
IR focuses on a single unit of analysis - ‘China thinks’, ‘China says’, and ‘China 
wants’.  
It is not just realist scholars that tend to treat China as a single actor or entity. 
Those who write from a liberal tradition should be aware of the need to disaggregate 
the state and consider on whose behalf state actors are undertaking IR. They should 
also be aware of the need to move beyond the state as an actor in IR, considering the 
role of a range of non state actors – but most clearly economic actors. Yet although 
there is a strong liberal tradition in writings on Chinese IR, the liberalism often only 
extends to the process and objectives of engaging China – the way in which engaging 
China can bring it into the international system and socialise it into the dominant 
western liberal global order. It is also sometimes extended to an understanding of who 
is engaging China but moving beyond a simply statist understanding (though typically 
based on an understanding that it is still governments who are the main actors and 
facilitate engagement). But much of this liberal literature in some ways stops being 
liberal when it gets to the Chinese side of the equation, still treating the Chinese state 
as a single straightforward unit of analysis and of Chinese state actors as the actors in 
IR. The concept of China as the unit of investigation is not always questioned, and the 
question of which groups and interests Chinese state actors are representing is rarely 
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asked. Once again, the failing here is the aggregation of ‘China’ into a single focus of 
analysis that is the problem for me 
 
IR analyses of Transnational Economic Networks 
Many realists are also largely unconcerned about economics viewing it as a separate 
sphere of enquiry to be left to economists to study. However, there are two exceptions 
to this general rule. First, international economic relations are considered to be 
important when they embody or reflect power politics between states in a game of 
mercantilist competition – a subset of politics that can be dealt with by state-to-state 
diplomatic relations with little attention paid to the role of non-state actors. Second, 
economic factors are important in establishing conceptions of national power that 
move beyond traditional security issues – something akin to the Chinese conception 
of comprehensive national power (总合国力 zonghe guoli). The language of 
international relations that focuses on the state as actor is echoed in political analyses 
of actors in international economic relations, which in turn feed into understandings 
of China’s rising economic power – ‘China dominates in the production of’, ‘China 
leads the way in exports of’, ‘China is the leading producer of’, and so on (Hale and 
Hale 2003).17  Here international economic relations are typically viewed in terms of 
interactions between nation states (or equivalents1). As with those economistic 
approaches noted above, the domestic economy is aggregated into a single unit - 
‘China’.  
Not only does this approach fail to disaggregate ‘China’ itself – 
geographically, sectorally, and in all the ways already mentioned above – it also 
                                                 
17  It’s a bit unfair to cite Hale and Hale as an example here as they acknowledge that China’s 
‘leading’ position is largely a result of foreign investment. But this piece remains a good 
example – partly because it largely considers China as a single unit of analysis, and also partly 
because articles in Foreign Affairs are read by a wider audience than articles in purely 
academic journals.   
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makes a fundamental error. It tends to treat international economic relations as exactly 
that – inter national (between nations) – whereas the reality of trade and investment 
patterns does not conform to conceptions of two states (or even more states) doing 
things to each other when it comes to trade and investment. This conceptual error is 
compounded by the evidential context used to support such inter national approaches - 
and then people look at these misleading statistics and develop misled conclusions 
about ‘Chinese power’ in the production of these goods. Trade and investment figures 
are bilateral in nature, displaying an interaction that at best is only a snapshot of what 
is happening at one small part of a much longer chain of interactions. Moreover, the 
penultimate territory in which production takes place is typically considered to be the 
exporter and credited with the resulting trade surplus with the final territory (the 
market). Notwithstanding regulations on rules of origin in calculating trade figures, it 
is still the case that 100 per cent of the value of an import to the USA can be credited 
to China, ever if the majority of that value was originally imported to China from 
other territories. Although Chinese companies do seem to be occupying more of the 
product chain, historically at least, exports from Foreign Invested Enterprises have 
been massively dependent on imported components - primarily from South East Asia, 
Taiwan and Japan but also from the US and Europe.  
China as a whole is clearly benefiting from its position in the global economy 
– but not as much as appears at first sight to the casual observer looking at the 
aggregate figures (and certainly not as much as those who point to the inevitable 
China challenge to world order often suggest). Others have also benefited 
significantly from what has happened in China. For example, consumers in the west 
are now paying less in actual pounds, dollars and euros (let alone real terms) for 
goods than they were five or even 10 years ago. And some of the main beneficiaries 
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of economic growth in China have been the companies that have closed their old 
factories in the expensive developed world and moved their production to China (and 
elsewhere) – even if this has resulted in job losses in the west that are often blamed on 
this thing called ‘China’.  
 Of course, it’s entirely understandable that international relations scholars 
focus on relations between nations. But if we want to keep nations as the unit of 
analysis, then we need to be much more nuanced and consider how post-fordist 
production process result in a highly fragmented process spanning many different 
countries.18 Is it China that is leading the way, for example, in the production of TVs 
and computers or even training shoes, or is china still largely the conduit through 
which money and technology from other countries is processed? Is China the 
generator of global growth, or the conduit through which other interests outside China 
maintain dominant positions on global trade and investment hierarchies? Perhaps after 
all, the search for the location of power in nations is misplaced, and we should instead 
be considering key global actors such as Walmart and Nike in our search for the 
location of global power.  
 
Conclusions – GDPism, Domestic Politics, and International Relations 
The suggestion that growth should not simply be equated with development would 
come as no surprise whatsoever to the Chinese leadership. Indeed, the period between 
the 16th and 17th party congresses in 2002 and 2007 respectively witnessed a key shift 
from a growth to a developmental paradigm. Clearly, generating growth is important 
but its what is done with that growth that generates development (or not as the case 
may be). The evidence of the previous paradigm under Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji 
                                                 
18  That much more of this investment has its origins in the US that the bilateral investment 
figures can show is an entire study in itself - and forms part of Breslin (2007: 106-30). 
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was that unevenly distributed growth had not only exacerbated inequality, but had 
also failed to reduce poverty as much as might have been expected, and had done little 
to ensure the adequate provision of health education and welfare (particularly in rural 
areas). Additionally for Yu Yongding (2006), the predominance of processing 
assembly in Chinese trade has meant that export growth has had a remarkably minor 
impact in terms of promoting domestic industrial upgrading and laying the 
foundations for a more sustainable and developmentally orientated economic future. 
Whilst the Chinese media takes care to show the party as a successful and 
modernising organisation, this vision of China is balanced with a recognition of the 
many developmental objectives that remain to be attained, and the crucial role that 
party and state officials have to play at all levels to reach these goals.  
So a key conclusion of this paper is that the study of china’s global role should 
be re-embedded in the study of the domestic. At the very least, those 
understandings/predictions that ignore the domestic (or assume a continued stable 
political position with the only challenge a democratic one) should acknowledge that 
they cannot even start to understand how the social problems identified by Chinese 
scholars and the current Chinese leadership create significant constraints on global 
ambitions and global potentials. In addition, it is simply apolitical to simply assume 
that China will follow expected developmental trajectories irrespective of political 
action by the government and other actors within China.  
 A second conclusion is that misunderstandings or unrealistic evaluations of 
Chinese power are partly deliberately constructed by interested parties in an attempt 
to influence policy – and that these evaluations have a real impact on the construction 
of other countries’ policies towards China. So in some respects, whether China really 
does possess such power or not is irrelevant – if it is assumed to be powerful now or 
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soon, and policies developed on the understanding that China has that power now, 
then Chinese power is bestowed on it from others.  
 The third conclusion is that how China is perceived depends very much on the 
epistemologies and approaches deployed. Most clearly, at least some of the 
exaggerated understandings of China as inevitable superpower soon and engine of the 
global economy now are mistaken because of the way that observers conceive of 
international relations in general, and international economic relations in particular. 
The aggregation of China into a single unit for analysis and the focus on economic 
relations between nation states may generate simple and easily comprehended 
conclusions about the nature of power in world of nation states. But if the reality of 
production, finance and trade does not simply map onto a state centric conception of 
inter-national relations, then focussing on the latter cannot explain the future. Ease of 
comprehension is clearly laudable - but not if it is only achieved by ignoring the 
messy complexity of multiple transactions in a post-fordist global capitalist world. 
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